Abstract: This article addresses the following question: what insights can the literature on legal pluralism and cultural pluralism written by ethnographers of courts provide analysts interested in studying legislatures? The ethnographic insights developed by anthropologists of courts can not be imported into the study of legislatures wholesale. In this article, I explore the ways analyses of cultural pluralism shift when one changes institutional vantage points from courts to legislatures. I discuss how the courts' legal labor occurs while people strive for objective justice while legislatures' legal labor occurs while people strive for accountable representation. I argue that three central analytical shifts take place for scholars. First, in courts, contexts are often made cultural as one technique among many to create a suitable interpretation that will lead to resolution. From a legislative perspective, contexts are often made cultural using a demographic imagination, that is, through a form of quantification. Second, in courts, only outsiders tend to embody culture, contributing to an ahistorical account of what culture is. In legislatures, anyone, even representatives themselves, can be cultural, making being cultural into a political tactic centered on rendering historical and social connections visible. Third, in legislatures, law is always a compromise. As law travels out of legislatures and into courts, the agonism at the heart of law is forgotten, and law becomes acontextual, and putatively objective.
Legal scholars have long known that much-needed insights become inaccessible when one characterizes the state in monolithic terms.
1 Nuanced approaches to how states are comprised of diverse and multifaceted institutions have become even more urgent as contemporary governments restructure courts, legislatures and the executive branch in response to international institution-building and neoliberal re-structuring. In the wake of these political and legal transformations, scholars have called for greater attention to how the legislative branch functions. Bauman and Kahana have recently edited a volume on the legislative branch calling for new theoretical approaches to this branch of government, one which they argue has faced "systematic neglect by legal and political philosophers. As people in courts and people in legislatures engage with laws, they do so under two different evaluative rubrics. In courts, people grapple with applying laws to cases to produce what they hope will be perceived as objective justice. By contrast, legislators write laws anticipating that others will evaluate their actions in terms of whether they are providing accountable representation. These different evaluative frameworks shape how court officials and legislators attempt to interweave laws and contexts. 9 In courts, people apply laws to particular situations, putting laws and contexts in dialogue with each other in order to produce objective justice. For example, when Trinidadian judges and lawyers apply the Domestic Violence Act, they are determining whether a particular law is appropriate for a specific case. 10 In legislatures, people write laws after debating the contexts which appear to create the need for the legislation, moving from contexts to laws. They do so as spokespeople for others' interests and needs. When Trinidadian many others. 9 Laws are often explicit guidelines of how the world should be, accounts that must be applied to given contexts and constitute the contexts through these technologies of application. In this sense, people engaged with laws understand laws to be apart from the world and applicable to the world. This very applicability to the world is the instantiation of law's power. 10 M. Lazarus-Black, 'Law and the Pragmatics of Inclusion: Governing domestic violence in Trinidad and legislators formulated the Domestic Violence Act, they needed to understand violent interactions between men and women as practices that could be transformed into legislative objects -indeed much of the parliamentary debate revolved around whether this was the prerogative of the legislature to do so. 11 The difference between writing and applying, and the attendant evaluative frameworks, ensure that people understand and create the links between laws and contexts differently in courts and in legislatures. This forms the basis of my comparison-what one can do with, through and about law because of laws' different relationships with contexts in these two arenas.
In seeking to apply laws, people in court contexts are relying on the way laws are acontextual, the way laws represent a universalizable rationality that is supposed to produce objective justice. Bourdieu writes:
Indeed, what we could call the "juridical sense" or the "juridical faculty" consists precisely in such a universalizing attitude. This attitude constitutes the entry ticket into the juridical field --accompanied, to be sure, by a minimal mastery of the legal resources amassed by successive generations, that is, the canon of texts and modes of thinking, of expression, and of action in which such a canon is reproduced and which reproduce it. This fundamental attitude claims to produce a specific form of judgment, completely distinct from the often wavering intuitions of the ordinary sense of fairness because it is based upon rigorous deduction from a body of internally coherent rules. 12 Bourdieu suggests that for courts, the fact that laws exist outside of context enables people to see laws as instantiations of objective justice. He argues this supposed objectivity is re-affirmed by the very struggle to make laws apply, that is, by the labor inherent in making laws' abstractions relevant to diffuse contexts. Tobago.' 28 American Ethnologist (2001) 388-416. 11 Id. 12 P. Bourdieu, 'The force of law: toward a sociology of the juridical field' 38 Hastings Law Journal By contrast, objective justice is not the dominant achievement one strives for in a legislative context. I want to suggest, reading alongside Carol Greenhouse's analysis of how neoliberal principles encroach on legislative practice, 13 that the parallel to the court's claims to provide objective justice is the legislature's claims to provide accountable representation. 14 Legislators vindicate their practices by supplying evidence that they are performing accountable representation, just as court officials must perform their engagements with objective justice. While it might appear that democratic representatives are in positions of power, they themselves express their position as one that is hampered and constricted. Greenhouse writes: "Moreover, we should not assume that holding office maximizes power. Given the embeddedness of state power in the private sector, it would seem that the interregnum is the power position, rather than the incumbency with its imperatives of accountability and availability. To admit of this exemption would, on Waite's account, lead immediately onto a slippery slope, in which savagery would find its place in the midst of civilization. To condone that difference, to welcome the stranger within, would be an invitation to an escalating savagery. Disorderly difference is the invitation to dread, which it is the job of law both to name and to tame.
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What counts as a challenge to laws' ordering is itself a social construct -the invitation to dread is thus also an invitation to construct disorder. They argue that faced with such disorderly difference, laws often end up being an assertion of power, not an assertion of objectivity. Rather, it is the quandary representatives and their constituents can face, depending on their ideologies of culture and representation.
In the next section, I lay out the ways in which objective justice and accountable representation shape how courts and legislatures attempt to interweave laws and context.
It is the differences in the legal labor between writing laws and applying laws which grounds this section's comparison. The labor of legislatures and the labor of courts produce commensurable and distinct engagements with laws, shaped by the overarching evaluative frameworks people bring to bear on the different institutions' projects. The rest of this article explores three ways in which cultural pluralism challenges the labor of these institutions. In the first section, I look at the techniques by which contexts are framed as cultural in these two legal arenas. In legislatures, laws are understood to originate as condensed compromises of plural and agonistic interests. When writing laws, laws are understood to emerge out of compromises between perspectives that can potentially be framed as culturally plural perspectives. From this perspective, different laws can have conflicting cultural contexts at the heart of their origin stories. In courts, laws' presumed objectivity ensures that the contexts to which the courts will apply laws tend to be framed as cultural. Thus, contexts and people (not associated with the court) can be cultural, but laws and court officials will often not be understood as cultural. In this section, I focus on the implications having acultural laws and cultural contexts has for analyzing cultural pluralism from a court's perspective.
My third section explores how people are understood to embody cultural difference in both areas. Participants in courts and legislatures pay ever more attention to questions of "culture," but often deploy the term in ways which presume that only select people are understood to be culture-bearers. In courts, as I mentioned, people outside the courts often stand for culture, which entails the dilemmas inherent when a person indexes a way of life. In legislatures, representing culturally diverse constituents is one variant of the challenge to produce accountable representation. In both cases, the analytical questions revolve around the quandaries that arise when a person embodies another level of social unity, be it an ethnic group or a culture. The institutional vantage point shapes what it means to collapse types of social unities, or levels of scale, in each instance.
In my fourth section, I look at how the tensions between making laws and applying laws enable cultural difference to be a source of transformation in legislatures more readily than courts. Court officials experience cultural pluralism as another sort of challenge-they make culture and cultural expectations explicit in order to transform cultural context into something analogous to laws. In doing so, cultural assumptions often lose their ability to unsettle and potentially transform. By contrast, in legislatures, cultural difference often underpins debates between different perspectives on how laws should best regulate different contexts. Through these debates, assumptions and alternative possibilities are made explicit, and, as a consequence, laws become open to change. In legislatures, the explicitness that cultural pluralism engenders creates possibilities for legal change. As laws travels from legislatures to courts, revealing cultural assumptions can shift from having the potential to transform laws to becoming a path towards re-affirming law's power.
Comparing Legal Labor
To understand the institutional specificity at hand, one must pay attention to how these two different institutions structure people's pragmatic relationship to laws and their relationship to contexts. Each institution enables people to engage with both laws and contexts differently. Here I discuss how the projects of writing laws versus adjudicating laws shape people's experiences of how laws and contexts are interwoven. For court officials, laws are both acontextual and applicable to context, linked to particular circumstances through competing interpretations and ideally an instantiation of an objective justice. For legislators, laws are proleptic projects, produced out of agonistic discussions and through practices ideally transparent to a nation's citizenry.
In comparing adjudicating and legislating, it is useful to turn to how people understand legal interpretation. Court officials have an equivocal relationship to laws' susceptibility to context. Judicially, this aspect can often be experienced as an imposition. While legislators might see themselves as empowered to respond positively to laws' vulnerability, this vulnerability is precisely what court officials experience as the challenge of law, that laws requires interpretation. As Bourdieu points out, interpretation is the source of contention in the juridical field. He claims that the struggle in courts is over "the authority of the act of interpretation."
18 By focusing on the authority of the interpretation, the court officials disguise the ways in which they are engaging with power, emphasizing instead legal interpretation. Bourdieu writes:
Even though jurists may argue with each other concerning texts whose meaning never imposes itself with absolute necessity, they nevertheless function within a body strongly organized in hierarchical levels capable of resolving conflicts between interpreters and interpretations. Furthermore, competition between interpreters is limited by the fact that judicial decisions can be distinguished from naked exercises of power only to the extent that they can be presented as the necessary result of a principled interpretation of unanimously accepted texts.
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The contests often enable court officials to see themselves as merely providing competing rational interpretations of how laws and cases might connect. The challenge in navigating the judicial field successfully lies in winning this battle of interpretation, while committing to seeing this as an issue of successful interpretation, not simply implementing law's power.
In struggling over which interpretation is legitimate, those people who belong to the courts legitimate the notion that laws themselves are acontextual and rational. Their success depends upon their ability to extend the "rationality" of laws to the everyday always anticipated (though many assume that this is more likely now than it used to be) but for the more basic reason that this is the reference point, the audience, the location of reader-response which may or may not feed back into the conditions of initial textual production." 22 Legislators attempt to anticipate acts of interpretation, often battling over the wording of bills in efforts that acknowledge the context-dependent nature of laws as they are being made as well as the pitfalls of applying them. In short, the difference between a legislative and juridical perspective in interpretation is that in courts, laws are texts to be read while, in legislatures, laws are texts to be written.
Both in courts and legislatures, connecting laws and contexts is an agonistic activity. In each institution, the translations between laws and contexts at the center of any engagement with laws are invariably contested ones. Juridical and legislative translations each try to transform the complexities of daily practices into explicit legal formulations. By this I mean that in courts, those belonging to juridical field struggle to control how people's pre-juridical behavior and understandings are transformed into legally adjudicable formulations. As Bourdieu points out, lawyers and expert witnesses are all intent on refiguring others' speech and behavior into legally interpretable forms.
Those under the courts' jurisdiction must have their interactions translated into court decisions. At the same time, their advocates are also struggling over the precise nature of the interpretation, each hoping to determine which version of rational interpretation will dominate in the final rendition of how laws apply to the situations that require such reformulation. In this sense, battles over translation are at the heart of every court proceedings.
Similarly, translation is at the heart of every legislative proceedings. What legislators attempt to do is translate constituents' needs and their political party's ideologies into laws. They are also refiguring their claims, anticipating and responding to other parties' critiques. In each arena, linking laws and contexts is invariably a contested activity, and this foundational antagonism requires techniques for evaluating and choosing one's own and others' interpretative efforts for temporary resolutions.
Legal Labors and Cultural Pluralism
While plurality poses challenges to people's efforts both to make and apply laws, these challenges emerge in analytically distinctive ways in courts and legislatures because of where and how cultural difference is located in each arena. Courts and legislatures bring institutionally specific challenges to studies of cultural pluralism.
In general, from a perspective of cultural pluralism, one of law's significant labors is to constitute the social groups to which it is then applied. In these moments, people deploying laws reflexively understand laws to be pluralistic, framing the relationships between groups and potentially framing different laws for each group. Wastell explains:
"So it follows that law . . . not only objectifies social groups (among other things), but also the very act of law-making through which those social groups are constituted." Fijian laws sort people and help to structure the relationships between the groups people have been sorted into. As Wastell points out, laws can classify the social world, and in doing so, determines how to comprise relations between entities.
In being the source for constituting appropriate relations between and within social groups, laws make themselves vulnerable. After all, their objectifications are attempts, not certainties, and can stop being relevant for a particular context. In courts, a mismatch between laws and contexts challenges laws' effectiveness directly. Court officials are not responsible for laws' failures when they are applying laws to particular situations, the law is. In courts, the further the tacit assumptions about social groups and their relations drift from the contexts to which they must be applied, the more problematic the particular law becomes. Efforts to make this critique effective underlies many legislative debates--rival party members often claim their opponents are misrepresenting how a proposed law will ameliorate a problem, that is, how laws and contexts will intertwine. For example, Paul
Spencer describes how Labour members and Conservative members will criticize each other publicly in an English town council. When the town council was discussing whether to allow a corporation to purchase publicly owned land for development, both sides attacked each others' legislative policies in terms of what the corporation putatively was capable of accomplishing.
The two part groups faced one another as adherents of opposed political ideologies. But in the context of the council chamber, their arguments inevitably tended to focus on the performance of the corporation's undertakings, especially in those respects in which Labour policies were seen to stand or fall. By generalizing the theme, any activity to the credit or to the discredit of the council, regardless of its true political content, could be used by the two sides to bring credit or discredit to the Labour group, and by implication, to its policies. 25 The arguments in this council all revolved on different parties' success in interpreting fluctuating contexts adequately into appropriate laws. Underlying their critiques is the 25 P. Spencer, 'Party Politics and the Processes of Local Democracy in an English Town Council.' In Councils in Action. Eds. A. Richards and A. Kuper, (1971): 192-193. assumption that the responsibility for shaping laws to contexts is in the hands of legislators, or a political party's ideology. In short, implicitly, legislators are responsible for whether laws and contexts are adequately and competently connected. In the following sections, I explore how cultural pluralism affects plays in the dynamics I sketched above, that is, what happens when people understood contexts in terms of culture. what is acultural is crucially constitutive for how contexts can be anticipated as cultural prior to being interwoven with laws. In comparing how courts frame what is cultural and acultural versus how legislatures do so, I want to suggest that this difference primarily lies in how the different institutions figure people's relationships with the larger social unities, often states. In courts, the primary focus is on how people forge bonds in front of these social unities-states, villages, religious communities, and so on. By contrast, in legislatures, the primary focus is on how people forge bonds to these social unities. 26 In courts, cultural differences are performed for the state or community, while in legislatures, cultural differences are the bases for conceptualizing and quantifying various populations' collective interests. In legislatures contexts are imbued with "culture" largely through a demographic imagination while in courts, culture is but one frame for using analogies to translating the dynamics of a particular case.
Seeing Culture as Context through Demography, Seeing Culture as Context through Cases
In courts, people tend to present contexts in front of the state, rather than exploring the obligations of people and nation-states implicit when emphasizing relationships to the state. In legislatures, the concern is predominantly on how to imagine the qualities of people populating a situation-how to render needs and inequalities visible through quantification. 27 This shift in focus alters how contexts become cultural.
The move from courts to legislatures in this case is a move from seeing cultural differences in terms of analogies to seeing cultural differences in terms of equivalences.
In courts, however, the question is how to apply laws to a context by making the situation or context analogous to other cases that the laws have already defined. Mather and The legal process, says Levi, is not "the application of known rules to diverse facts, but rather a system of rules which are discovered in the process of determining similarity or difference between cases; "the finding of similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process" (1949: 3, 2). What determines that key step? Levi says that litigants and their lawyers must present competing examples or analogies to the court, and the judge will then choose the determining classification (1949: 2-5).
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The work of courts is to create analogies, to link narratives and circumstances to each other in a chain of precedent, or, occasionally, to break the chain by fashioning new precedent. In forging these analogies, culture is often but one frame to accomplish this.
When adjudicating, the frames are created through analogies to other legal cases, the question of which definition will be used is of considerable significance to the outcome. Whether the discourse is specialized or more general, disputes will be narrowed in ways acceptable to a third party (either to appeal to the third party or inflicted by the third party). This introduces interests beyond those of the disputants into the dispute at hand; most likely these additional interests will reflect the power of the third or political interests of those connected to the third.
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People try to enter into some agreement about how best to link their situation to available legal categories. This then enables court officials to find similarities between cases, opening the path for resolution through analogies. Mather and Yngvesson point out that people might attempt the opposite as well, seeking to expand the terms for understanding the situations entirely. In these moments, participants are often attempting to overturn or speak against the normative order. 35 They are trying to find ways to use interpretations to show the failure of analogy, and perhaps introduce newness into the legal order. In short, in court contexts, laws can only be applicable to context when a form of categorization through analogy occurs. This form of categorization is substantively different then the categorization by equivalence required by a legislature's demographic imagination.
Culture plays a different role in defining context when courts use the similarities of cases to link laws and contexts in contrast with legislatures, which do so by using quantifiable distinctions between populations.
Because from a judicial perspective analogy is the dominant analytical tool for interpreting context, when contexts are framed as cultural in courts, the judicial perspective often requires that culture function as an analogy to law. Extortion-type crimes committed by Asians in Auckland City have increased 760 percent in the last 3 years, to the point where one Auckland judge asked whether it was "kidnap week". Senior constables from around the country are saying that Asian crime is a huge problem. Top Chinese officials state that young Asians are getting hooked on crime in this country, and still the Minister denies that there is a problem that needs to be addressed under this bill. In a legislative arena, culture is understood in terms of its statistically visible effects. As a consequence, when cultural difference is the basis for legislation supporting cultural pluralism, it is typically a cultural pluralism that is expected to resolve a statistically framed inequity experienced by a portion of the population. For example, when the New Zealand Parliament began to debate whether to create culturally specific legal responses to child abuse and juvenile delinquency, children's needs were discussed in terms of their culturally-based statistical risks. Māori representative TirikateneSullivan characterized Māori children as being at risk in the following manner during this debate:
Statistics show that 56 percent of all Māori births were ex-nuptial, compared with the non-Māori figure of 17.8 percent of births. Those figures highlight my concern for the children of those mothers, especially given that perhaps half of the Māori children born in 1984 began their lives in an unstable family position.
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In this, and many other moments, legislators see people with cultures largely in terms of how they quantify in relation to other populations. The social groups that are being 43 NPZP, July 25, 1992. fashioned in legislation are groups emergent out of a demographic imagination, not a historical one. This raises dilemmas which I will address in my second section on how people can embody these distinct forms of difference.
To sum up, contexts are framed as cultural through substantively different techniques in legislatures and in courts. In legislatures, where people are forging bonds to the state, contexts are quantifiably cultural. Here culture often exists as a marker to explain inequalities in population. In courts, by contrast, where people are in front of the state, culture is often an analogy to law. Culture serves an alternative set of guidelines that court officials can use as a resource as they attempt to create consensus over how to frame the context that laws are meant to be addressing. In the next section, I compare how people embody culture in legislatures versus courts. In addition, I address some of the quandaries that emerge when culture is expected to behave as law, especially in the contexts of battles over indigenous recognition.
Politically Significant Others, Legally Significant Others
How people embody cultural difference shifts from courts to legislatures. As I mentioned earlier, legislatures are dominated by the need to produce accountable representation. Legislators are faced with the challenge of representing culturally mixed populations, providing laws that apply to them all. Courts offer a different conundrum in the ways they require people to embody culture, since select outsiders to the courts are typically the ones treated as culture-bearers. Court officials will tend to portray themselves as acultural in their efforts to fashion objective justice, treating those who travel through the courts as potentially cultural. By contrast legislators sometimes speak to the ways they themselves are cultural to justify their stances as representatives of particular constituents. In both cases, issues of scale are at stake. In courts, the question is how can one person stand for a culture? In legislatures, the question is how can one person speak for a multitude? In practice, the difference between speaking for multitudes and speaking as a culture has different consequences as people's relationships to laws unfold.
In both courts and legislatures, certain people can embody culture, while others remain resolutely understood through acultural frameworks. In the court context, often people involved in the cases can be interpreted along cultural lines, while court employees are figured as acultural. For example, lawyers and judges invoke culture to contextualize others' behavior, not their own. Cultural difference is often figured along similar lines in legislatures, with certain minority legislators or represented groups that serve as the objects of policy discussed as cultural, yet legislative practices are rarely understood as cultural in their own right. For people in these legal contexts, the culture concept since the 1980s has increasingly become available as an interpretative tool for comprehending difference. The differences culture is meant to explain are frequently differences derived from context, and are not presumed to underpin the legal institutions involved. This raises the question: what are the consequences for these legal arenas of having culture embodied by some people and not others?
As many scholars have pointed out, unevenly attributing culture puts an onus on the people expected to embody culture. 44 When people are described as having culture in a legal context, they are presumed to be engaging with an identifiably different and historically indeterminate (yet nonetheless locatable) social order that contains explicit guidelines for behavior. There is often an implicit expectation that these people can be consistently interpreted as culturally different-participating in modern practices like bingo games and Tupperware parties places these cultural interpretations in jeopardy.
That is, the differences must be different enough. 45 In addition, often experts in the culture, not necessarily people from that culture, must be able to address explicitly how disparate practices are all unified under the rubric of a culture. From a legal perspective, to have culture, thus, is to have an explicit understanding of why one does what one does, an understanding that must be contextualized in terms of one's relationship to traditions.
Notice that in these legal situations, other people present will not be required to be accompanied by a concept of tradition that frames their actions.
Within the politics of recognition, indigeneity and its representations frequently condense many of the dilemmas emergent when a person embodies culture, particularly when first nation issues haunt the political landscape. Indigenous people represent a moment supposedly timeless, their social unities are assumed to exist prior to the surrounding modern unities. As a result, the arrangement that indigenes have with current social unities are invariably markers of those unities' origins. Jeffrey Sissons reminds readers:
In order to maintain an illusion of political legitimacy these postsettler states have been forced to recognize the prior occupation of colonized peoples, or first peoples, and the right of these peoples to maintain and develop their indigenous cultures. Postsettler nationhood and indigeneity are, therefore, inseparable; they are two sides of the same coin, literally so in some cases.
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In court contexts, people are often asked to embody cultural difference in a fashion that condenses or sharpens the paradoxes of the liberal multicultural nation-state. In The Cunning of Recognition, Povinelli points out that indigenous in particular are often expected to speak for a circumscribed radical difference in courts of law. This radical Otherness is circumscribed in two senses. First, the indigene is expected to represent a complex intersection between modern experiences and traditional practices. Indigenes are presumed to have knowledge of what traditional laws and other social practices used to be prior to colonialism or other encounters with a transformative modernity. They do not live according to these principles currently, because they are forced to navigate the treacherous demands of modern life, such as the capitalist market. As a consequence, while they are able to speak for the traditional cultural practices which the court wants to validate, their testimony is always suspect. They become vehicles through which the court can reach an understanding of a pre-contact culture, but this is labor on the part of court officials as they seek to disentangle the corrupting influences of modernity from their testimony. In short, in standing for cultural difference, indigenous are not allowed to stand for a hybridity, any indication that they are not other enough make them suspect.
In addition, Povinelli argues that the indigene can not stand for cultural traditions repugnant to the liberal morality of that nation. . . . in actual social worlds those who consider themselves to be liberal are confronted with instances of intractable social differences that they do not set aside-that they do not feel they can or should set aside. They encounter instances of what they experience as moments of fundamental and uncanny alterity: encounters with differences they consider abhorrent, inhuman, and bestial, or with differences they consider too hauntingly similar to themselves to warrant social entitlements-for example, land claims by indigenous people who dress, act, and sound like the suburban neighbors they are.
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The indigene is trapped into displaying a cultural difference that is alternative enough to vindicate the possibility that they stand for a different world view, but not so different that they threaten liberal morality. Sometimes one's culture is supposed to be the intelligible (and translatable) context that shapes one's sociality instead of one's engagement with "modern" and putatively acultural context. As I mentioned earlier, when culture is viewed from a judicial perspective, culture becomes analogous to law. In practice, this means that when the culture concept is used as the foundational building block for legal pluralism, culture becomes operationalized as a set of rules or explicit formulations that can be applied to contexts and parallels law. In courts, when people are representing a culture, they are representing a set of rules that distinguishes them from everyone else. under the cultural defense, the culture invoked often becomes a substitute for their intentions 50 -instead of intending to kill, their culture made them murder.
In courts, the people who are framed as culture-bearers often are not the ones translating culture into a legal rubric. Often it is expert witnesses and court officials who serve as the interpreters. In the case of indigenous plaintiffs or defendants, they often embody culture in suspect ways, precisely because they are interpreting cultural rules and applying them to contexts. The problem court officials must engage with when faced with cultural claims is how to navigate the ways in which scale gets conflated when a person speaks for culture, that is, how a person can speak as culture without implicitly discrediting law by revealing law to be cultural. In my own family we had to deal with a man who beat not just his wife---my niece---but also his children. We were strong enough to deal with that, but there are many families out there who are not, and that is where this House comes in. 52 Here, and in other cases, the culture concept is used by representatives to claim special knowledge and justify making decisions on their constituents' behalf. argues that Congressmen must navigate the paradoxes generated when illegal immigrants are discussed alongside the origin myth of the United States as a migrant's ideal. She claims that Congressmen have difficulty condemning illegal immigrants at the same time as they extol America as a country filled with the opportunity for social mobility for hardworking migrants. If the United States is the land of opportunity for migrants, how does one justify withholding opportunity from illegal migrants? Illegal migrants present an intriguing challenge, with their reputed willingness to work and longing to improve their economic lot. Often, to distinguish between legal migrants and illegal migrants, representatives had to dehumanize the illegal migrants, framing the debate as a question of population (and an inappropriately expanding population at that) rather than of people striving to better their situations.
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In the course of debating legislation about illegal immigration, various representatives and expert witnesses also discussed their own family's experiences of migrating the United States. 54 Reflecting on their own historical connections to this dilemma tended to accomplish two things. First, it tended to undermine other representatives' attempt to dehumanize the illegal immigrants. Through these narratives, the representatives and expert witnesses made visible the ways in which the myth of opportunity applied to illegal migrants. Second, the representatives used these personal accounts to promote dyadic connections, to point out one-to-one relationships between representatives and a single constituent. This focus served to undercut other legislators' attempts to conflate scale, which was implicit when these anti-migration legislators insisted on describing migrants in terms of population. Personal narratives made visible the representatives' own historically nuanced relationship with the nation. In so doing, the representative made the personal a basis for connecting with those they legislate. In short, representatives have available to them as a political resource the possibility of reflecting on their own cultural or historical connections as arguments for particular laws.
In part, legislators are able to embody cultural difference while court officials are not because of the exigencies of representation in contrast to the exigencies of adjudication. In representing, people will have to justify the grounds for which they can understand the needs and wants of their constituents. Claiming complex cultural connections can be one vehicle for doing so. In legislating, it can be important to make visible the kinds of social connections and social knowledge one can have of others. In these instances, it is not only a population that is cultural, it can be a representative as well. In courts, this is most distinctly not the case, since often courts demand that judges and lawyers speak from their legal position, from stances that are presumed objective. To be cultural in these instances would be to undermine their authority.
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54 Id. 281, 290. 55 Is there a parallel to the legislators who embody cultural contexts in their historical trajectories within courts? The cultural defense offers a neat inversion of what the legislators' claim to being a cultural being offers. Just as with the cultural legislator, in the cultural defense, people hope to apply laws to a particular context by describing a person as a culture-bearer. However, this conflation of person and culture in the name of understanding laws and context may be the primary similarity between the cultural legislator and the cultural defense. The cultural legislator uses their cultural engagement as another venue for demonstrating accountable representation-their particular history is meant to provide them with insights that supposedly lead to appropriate representative action. The direction is to enrich laws, and make them more fluidly applicable to particular contexts. The cultural defense takes precisely the opposite approach in making connections between laws and contexts. Rather than making laws more plural or more nuanced, the cultural defense reveals laws' supposed lack of culture. Laws can not apply properly in contexts where people's intentions are by contexts outside of the court's legal 
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imagination. In the cultural defense, culture as a set of norms is substituted for the defendant's intentions. It does not explain how laws can be linked to this particular context, but rather explains why laws are not appropriate to explain this context. It is no accident that the cultural defense arises in moments of sentencing, and has too often been described as comparable to the insanity defense (see Demian forthcoming, op. cit.). Here culture and insanity both are used to fracture a court's attempts to reconcile laws and situations, arguing instead that the situation was fashioned by people unable to act in ways that could put them in relation to laws.
Legislatures locate pluralisms, both cultural and legal, at different moments in the legal process than courts do. In legislatures, differences are explicitly at stake in the construction of laws. From a legislative perspective, pluralism is imagined in terms of interest groups or competing agendas between law-makers. Difference is at the heart of the legislative process, the cause for the compromises that affects the eventual shape and wording of laws. Laws may be described as the objectified compromises between different interest groups, different political agendas, or different cultural assumptions.
Regardless of how legislators or scholars choose to frame what constitutes difference, particular laws are invariably understood to be the result of compromises that respond to these differences.
These differences move to the background as laws travels into courts. In courts, people do not engage with laws as though they are a consequence of difference and compromise. Instead, in courts, the cultural differences that are foregrounded lie between courts and other arenas of dispute resolution or, more frequently, are embodied in the people who travel in and out of courts. As laws travel from legislatures to courts, the location of difference shifts from being embodied in the law itself to being embodied in the people who come before the law.
Legislatures, in part, are arenas of contesting definitions, constructing how to carve up the world through laws they will write in the process of debate and political compromise. What is intriguing about legislatures as an arena of law, as opposed to courts, is that explicitness has its own peculiar hazards in these contexts. When a political party frames the need to redress a social inequity, the grounds for how best to understand this social inequity are immediately opened for debate. Because legislators were so intent on critiquing each other's policy positions, they end up questioning many of the tacit framing assumptions their political opponents were using.
This clearly still occurs within parameters. Because the questions made many tacit assumptions explicit, even the parameters were at constant risk of being exposed. For
Lazarus-Black, while tracing how debates transform the implicit into the explicit, her task became to delineate why some connections and not others are foregrounded in this legislative arena.
59 Id. 994.
Lazarus-Black then turns to how the Domestic Violence Bill is implemented in the courts. In this moment of the analysis, Lazarus-Black shifts from focusing on the ways in which State and Family are seen as distinct entities that others must actively interweave through the vehicle of law. Instead, her task is to see how the two different regimes are in fact interwoven into a gendered bureaucracy that ultimately imbricates and assists each other's gendered agendas. In analyzing judicial practice, she argues that the Act never became as effective a protection as the lawmakers and feminist activists would wish. Cases were occasionally dismissed because court officials decided the case was not properly analogous to domestic violence cases. Lazarus-Black explains: "Sometimes after a case begins the magistrate realizes that the dispute is not 'really' about domestic violence; it may be a long-standing quarrel about rights to property." 60 The courts were focusing on how to frame a particular complaint, and in the process, taking the law so literally that women did not receive protection orders. 61 The court officials were not, as legislators had, questioning the underlying assumptions behind different ways to define a complaint.
Lazarus-Black focuses on how the very procedures courts used to process cases turned out to make the Act ineffective at re-structuring the ways in which Family and
State were distinguished and interconnected in Trinidad. She discusses how the ways in which court officials controlled time disempowered women. By the role of time in these cases, she refers to the time in which protection orders were processed, the time it took for cases to come to trial. Lazarus-Black writes: "Once they had made the decision to file a complaint, all of the women experienced what they referred to as the problem of 'time.' 60 Id. 994.
Importantly, the interviews revealed that by 'time' these women meant a variety of different circumstances involving different actors in the criminal justice system."
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Lazarus-Black points out that when women faced these time delays as well as other obstacles, they were encountering "structural deflection," 63 which ensured that this Act was infrequently put into practice. In looking at structural deflection, Lazarus-Black is examining how court practices engages with families and the state as interconnected unities. In general, when studying legislatures, analysts focus on how unities become actively interwoven, while studying courts, the task is to untangle the ways in which these unities are intertwined.
To sum up, laws in their originary moment in legislatures are widely understood to be the product of compromise and even shared disagreements. Because of the nature of political debate, distinctions and assumptions are often made explicit, and thus are open to revision, while elsewhere the same presuppositions may be kept stable and implicit. As a consequence, explicitness in legislatures often engenders the possibility of legal change. As laws travel into courts, this divisive origin, with its transformative potential, often moves into the background. For the legal scholar, this shift changes the task of analysis. In analyzing a legislative arena, scholars examine how writing laws are a series of compromises that merge (or ignore) a wide range of assumptions and conceptual resources available to the legislators. In analyzing a judicial arena, scholars turn to deconstructing the assumptions at play, and that are often implicitly adhered to through court practice. cultural into a political tactic centered on making historical and social connections visible. Third, and finally, in legislatures, laws are always a compromise, and thus is an object rift with the tensions inherent in the context it is meant to be a response to. As laws travel out of legislatures and into courts, the agonism at the heart of a law is forgotten, and the law becomes acontextual and applicable as a judicial object.
In this article, I recommend that scholars of cultural pluralism take more seriously the institutional vantage point shaping their object of inquiry. When one shifts institutions, how people engage with laws, culture and various forms of pluralism shift as well. One has to rethink questions that legal scholars have begun to take for granted after decades of tracing courts' engagements with cultural pluralism, questions revolving around how laws are linked to contexts, how law and social unities are interwoven, and how to locate legal change. When shifting to legislatures, our analytical toolkit needs to be re-fashioned, without discarding the insights that scholars of cultural pluralism in courts can provide.
